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Conceptual resources for learning science: issues of 
transience and grain-size in cognition and cognitive 
structure 
Keith S. Taber, Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge, U.K. 
Abstract 
Many studies into learners’ ideas in science have reported that aspects of learners’ 
thinking can be represented in terms of entities described in such terms as alternative 
conceptions or conceptual frameworks, which are considered to describe relatively 
stable aspects of conceptual knowledge that are represented in the learner’s memory 
and accessed in certain contexts. Other researchers have suggested that learners’ ideas 
elicited in research are often better understood as labile constructions formed in 
response to probes and generated from more elementary conceptual resources (e.g. 
phenomenological primitives or ‘p-prims’). This ‘knowledge-in-pieces perspective’ 
(largely developed from studies of student thinking about physics topics), and the 
‘alternative conceptions perspective’, suggest different pedagogic approaches. The 
present paper discusses issues raised by this area of work. Firstly, a model of 
cognition is considered within which the ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ and ‘alternative 
conceptions’ perspectives co-exist. Secondly, this model is explored in terms of 
whether such a synthesis could offer fruitful insights by considering some candidate 
p-prims from chemistry education. Finally, areas for developing testable predictions 
are outlined, to show how such a model can be a ‘refutable variant’ of a progressive 
research programme in learning science. 
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2 
Conceptual resources for learning science: issues of 
transience and grain-size in cognition and cognitive 
structure 
Introduction 
This paper considers one aspect of the programme of research into learning in science, 
viz. the nature and status of learners’ ideas reported in research. Studies have reported 
that learners’ ideas have a range of characteristics, from well-established highly stable 
conceptual frameworks for thinking about topics (Gilbert & Watts, 1983), to highly 
transient thoughts generated in situ (Claxton, 1993) when the respondent is not able to 
offer a response by accessing a matching pre-existing conceptual structure represented 
in memory. 
It is argued here that such a range is to be expected, but that it is important for 
researchers to be able to distinguish between thinking that reflects stable ‘alternative 
conceptions’ from thinking that constructs a viable but labile response to which the 
learner has little commitment. This issue is considered by reviewing the notion of ‘p-
prims’ and the ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ (diSessa, 1993) perspective that has been 
offered by some physics education researchers as an alternative to the ‘alternative 
conceptions’ perspective for interpreting learners’ ideas. 
The question explored here is whether it is possible to offer a coherent model of 
cognition that synthesises the ‘alternative conceptions’ and ‘knowledge-in pieces’ 
perspectives, whilst having the potential to offer heuristic guidance for future 
research. This paper suggests how a model of cognition encompassing both 
perspectives can be a feature of a progressive research programme into learning 
science; and offers an initial exploration of how such a model might be applied in the 
context of learning chemistry. 
This area of work is complicated by the intimate associations between the conceptual 
structures that may be the products of thought, the thinking processes themselves, and 
the physical substrate that allows such concepts to be represented in the brain: the 
importance of avoiding category errors across these distinctions has been highlighted 
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3 
by a number of commentators (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Ault, Novak and Gowin, 
1984; and Phillips, 1987). Figure 1 provides a model using Popper’s (1979) notion 
of the 3 Worlds to highlight the ontological differences between notions, such as 
‘cognitive structure’ and ‘alternative conception’, which are commonly used in 
science education when discussing student ideas and learning.  
(figure 1 about here) 
 
Figure 1: Cognitive structure, cognition, and conceptual 
structures 
The conceptual structures that may be the products of thought (in ‘World 3’) would 
include formal theories published in the scientific literature, as well as propositions 
and explanations elicited from learners (spoken in interviews or written in tests for 
example), and theoretical entities such as ‘alternative frameworks’ that science 
education researchers use to model student thinking when reporting their studies. 
Cognition itself (perceiving, thinking and remembering) is only directly experienced 
by the individual concerned, and so is part of Popper’s ‘World 2’, although it may be 
reported in ‘World 3’. Such cognitive processes are facilitated by the physical 
structures of the brain, and ultimately neural structure.  
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This physical, ‘World 1’, structure is here labelled cognitive structure. The term 
cognitive structure is well established (e.g. West & Pines, 1985) although there does 
not seem to be a single well-accepted meaning. “The facts, concepts, propositions, 
theories, and raw perceptual data that the learner has available to him [sic] at any 
point in time” (Ausubel and Robinson, 1971, p.51) would seem to be better 
considered as components of a learner’s conceptual ecology (Duschl & Hamilton 
1992), which will be represented in some form in the individual’s cognitive structure. 
Cognitive structure also represents the individual’s personal organisation of their 
knowledge (White, 1985), although at present we have a very limited understanding 
of how this representation takes place in terms of neural structures.  
Reference to structure may seem to imply something rigid and permanent (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980), but cognitive structure is part of an organic being, and can include (a) 
aspects which once developed remain substantially unchanged over decades (e.g. 
perceptual apparatus); (b) aspects which are being slowly modified over periods of 
days to months (laying down and consolidating memories); and (c) aspects which are 
in continual flux (changing activation levels of different neural circuits). 
Figure 1 reflects how the thinking that learners do is experienced subjectively, being 
only directly available to that individual. Such thinking may lead to ideas that are in 
some way represented physically in the brain (in cognitive structure), and which may 
also be expressed as objective ideas (in “the world of theories in themselves, and their 
logical relations; of arguments in themselves; and of problem situations in 
themselves” Popper, 1979:154). 
As Popper (1979: 155) suggested “the first world and the third world cannot interact, 
save through the intervention of the second world”. Researchers collect evidence of 
student thinking as it is expressed (represented) in Popper’s World 3. As well as 
using this data to interpret student thinking (in World 2), researchers may make 
inferences about how such thinking could reflect aspects of cognitive structure (in 
World 1): but clearly the way ideas are coded in neural circuits, and how they are 
expressed in (for example) verbal language, involve very different forms of 
representation. In this paper references to concepts and conceptions ‘stored’ in 
memory should be taken to mean that the formal concepts and conceptions are 
represented (i.e. coded) in cognitive structure. 
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The significance of the issue within the context of an established research 
programme 
There is a considerable body of research exploring learners’ ideas in science: research 
that concerns many science topics, undertaken with learners over a wide range of ages 
(Duit, 2006). This research is diverse in terms of both the methodological approaches 
used, and the ways in which the research is conceptualised. Studies are underpinned 
by a range of assumptions about the natures of learning processes; of student thinking; 
of mental structures; and so forth, and the ‘entities’ reported as the outcomes of the 
research are therefore also disparate. 
There has been considerable discussion of the assumptions underlying this area of 
research, and the status of the various models proposed by researchers as findings 
from their studies (discussed below). It has been argued elsewhere (Gilbert  & Swift, 
1985; Taber, 2006a) that this area of research may usefully be characterised as a 
scientific research programme in the sense suggested by Lakatos (1970). Within such 
a research programme there would be certain core ideas that are accepted by the 
various researchers in the field. It has been suggested (Taber, 2006a: 139) that in the 
research programme into learning in science, such ‘hard core’ commitments would 
inter alia include: 
• Learners come to science learning with existing ideas about many 
natural phenomena 
• Knowledge is represented in the brain as a conceptual structure  
• It is possible to model learners’ conceptual structures 
In terms of the model presented in Figure 1, there is an assumption that some stable 
aspects of a learner’s cognitive structure (World 1) tend to direct thinking (World 2) 
in particular ways, that students can report (represent in World 3) to teachers or 
researchers. Researchers can therefore develop models (also presented in World 3) of 
conceptual structures (conceptions, conceptual frameworks) that they consider to be 
in some sense ‘coded for’ in the learner’s cognitive structure. Such assumptions lead 
to key research questions for the programme. So for these three ‘hard core’ 
assumptions, we might ask: 
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• What ideas do learners’ bring to science classes, and what is the nature 
of these ideas? 
• How is knowledge organised in the brain?  
• What are the most appropriate models and representations of learners’ 
conceptual structures? 
Lakatos (1970: 135) referred to the answers to questions such as this, answers that 
build up the theoretical base of the programme, but which are open to dispute and 
development, as the ‘refutable variants’ of the programme.  
One particular area of contention in this particular research programme has been 
whether proposed alternative conceptions and frameworks do indeed represent stable 
aspects of learners’ mental structures, or whether they instead just reflect responses 
generated in situ when the researcher elicits data (or for that matter when a teacher 
asks a question in class, or when a student responds to an examination question). 
There is general agreement that learners do generate responses to research questions 
by thinking (i.e. a process) that draws upon ‘resources’ (represented in cognitive 
structure, i.e. brain structures that support cognition). However, researchers have 
disagreed over the question of the ‘grain-size’ of these mental resources accessed: is 
the thinking process a matter of identifying the most applicable pre-existing 
conceptual framework and processing the question ‘through’ it; or more a matter of 
generating a suitable way of thinking by drawing upon a range of disparate resources 
that need to be coordinated into a suitable structure for the ‘job in hand’. 
Characterising learners’ ideas along such dimensions is not purely an academic issue. 
Two other ‘hard core’ assumptions suggested for the research programme (Taber, 
2006a) are that: 
• Learners’ existing ideas have consequences for the learning of science 
• It is possible to teach science more effectively if account is taken of the 
learner’s existing ideas 
If research in science education is to inform pedagogy it is important to 
distinguish between ways of thinking that are well-established and tenacious 
and likely to impede new learning unless challenged; and ideas that may be 
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romanced when a learner is asked an unanticipated question about a topic that 
she has previously given little thought to, and might well never be generated, let 
alone committed to, in the absence of being asked what seems an obscure 
question. 
The stability of student thinking 
Much of the research exploring learners’ ideas about, and understanding of, science 
topics has been framed in terms of ‘misconceptions’, ‘alternative conceptions’ or 
‘alternative frameworks’ (Driver & Erickson, 1983; Gilbert, & Watts, 1983). 
Unfortunately, different authors use these (and other related) terms in different ways 
(Abimbola, 1988) so it is not possible to offer a consensus definition of such terms 
(Taber, 2006b). However, these terms are usually taken to imply that students have a 
stable way of thinking about, and understanding, a topic. The general view is that 
‘conceptions’ represent features stored in memory in some form, and activated as 
integral units.  
Indeed, many researchers have interpreted research data as evidence that learners may 
construct alternative explanatory schemes that are theory-like: that is, consistent, 
coherent, applied over extended periods of time and being applicable across a range of 
phenomena (e.g. Driver & Easley, 1978; Driver, Guesne & Tiberghien, 1985; 
Vosniadou, 1992; de Posoda 1997; Tytler 1998; Taber, 1995a, 2000). The tenacious 
nature of such ‘alternative frameworks’ was emphasised by those researchers who 
first brought ‘children’s science’ to wide notice (e.g. Gilbert, Osborne & Fensham, 
1982; Driver 1983; Watts 1983a; Watts & Gilbert 1983); as was the way such 
alternative frameworks could be coherent and sensible from the child’s perspective 
(Gilbert et al, 1982; Gilbert and Watts, 1983; Pope and Gilbert 1983; Watts 1983b). 
Other authors have interpreted research data from studies into students’ ideas as 
implying that learners’ thinking tends to be incoherent and inconsistent, fragmentary, 
context-bound and transient (e.g. Viennot 1979; BouJaoude, 1991; Solomon, 1992, 
1993; Claxton, 1993; Hennessy, 1993; Linder, 1993; Russell, 1993; Kuiper 1994) - 
and perhaps sometimes simply created in response to the social pressure of the 
researcher’s questions (Solomon 1993). So Hammer argues,  
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Research in science education, including physics, has mostly 
adopted unitary models of student thinking as reflecting naïve 
theoretical frameworks, robust misconceptions, and stages of 
development in reasoning abilities.  As models of cognitive 
structure, these fit well with a phenomenology of consistency over 
time and coherence among ideas.  The phenomenology I have 
sketched … has been more variegated and complex, and it confutes 
attributions of consistency and coherence to student reasoning. I … 
argue that student knowledge and reasoning is better modeled in 
terms of a manifold ontology of more fine-grained, context sensitive 
resources. 
Hammer, 2004a: 12 
From this perspective, the resources students draw upon when responding to questions 
(in class, in tests, in research interviews) are in themselves stable, but are used as 
components of a novel conceptual structure constructed in response to a specific 
context.  
Conceptual resources as ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ 
Smith, diSessa and Roschelle (1993) considered that there must be fundamental or 
primitive elements of cognition that learners use to construct their conceptions and 
conceptual frameworks. They highlight d the importance of “identifying a range of 
cognitive resources that can support the bootstrapping of more advanced cognitive 
structures” (p.125). diSessa (1993: 112) proposed such a class of “hypothetical 
knowledge structures” that he called phenomenological primitives, or ‘p-prims’ and 
which could act as “primitive elements of cognitive mechanism - as atomic and 
isolated a mental structure as one can find”. 
Conceptions are specific notions that are of the form of propositions (‘objects slow 
down because they run out of force’, ‘plants grow by taking material from the soil’, 
‘chemical reactions occur so that atoms can fill their shells’). By contrast, the 
hypothetical ‘atoms’ of cognition are primitive in the sense of acting at an early 
(preconscious) stage of cognition,  
[phenomenological primitives’ are] kinds of basic, in a sense 
axiomatic, intuitions that govern the understanding of physics 
phenomena on which students reflect even before undertaking any 
formal learning of physics. … relatively minimal abstractions of 
simple common phenomena which need no explicit justification for 
their existence 
Reiner & Gilbert, 2000: 501 
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These p-prims identify phenomena as matching common general patterns,  
P-prim are rather small knowledge structures, typically involving 
configurations of only a few parts, that act largely by being 
recognised in a physical system or in the system's behaviour or 
hypothesized behaviour. 
diSessa, 1993: 111 
This ‘pattern spotting’ is central to Gestalt psychology (Wertheimer, 1966), and 
indeed Andersson (1986) has discussed a p-prim labeled as ‘the experiential gestalt of 
causation’. Andersson believes that youngsters abstract a basic pattern that commonly 
recurs, involving an agent bringing about an effect through an instrument. Once such 
a p-prim is established, matching phenomena will be perceived as fitting this pattern 
and so ‘cause and effect’ will be ‘understood’ (i.e. these phenomena will fit the 
individual’s intuitions). 
From this perspective, the person has ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ – i.e. conceptual 
resources that can act as the elements for constructing knowledge in situ. DiSessa 
developed his ideas in some detail, and based on a range of empirical evidence 
proposed a substantial list of candidates for p-prims: intuitive notions which when 
verbalized can be described in such terms (1993: 219) as: 
• all motion, especially impulsively or violently caused, gradually dies 
away 
• changes take time to ‘blossom’  
P-Prims as resources for knowledge construction 
DiSessa and colleagues do not suggest that all of our knowledge is held and applied in 
the form of such fundamental elements as p-prims. P-prims are a h pothetical way of 
explaining both how people can provide answers to questions where they have no pre-
existing answer in place, and for explaining the origins of more complex and stable 
conceptual structures, i.e. at the levels of conceptions and conceptual frameworks (cf. 
Caravita & Halldén, 1994). An important part of the suggested roles of p-prims is to 
provide the ‘conceptual atoms’ to form complexes which will acquire their own 
permanence through being represented in cognitive structure, 
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P-prims are, in general, rather small and particular knowledge 
elements among a large collection...likely, p-prims will be used in 
clusters or in combination with other kinds of reasoning. 
diSessa, 1993: 118 
This clustering process (the building of more complex conceptual structures) has a 
direct analogy with the way we tend to use scientific knowledge. Complex scientific 
ideas can be explained in terms of ‘first principles’, but once we have developed the 
more advanced concepts we tend to use these directly (Taber, 1995b). In the same 
way, individual learners construct conceptual structures from primitive elements, and 
if these structures are found to be useful and so consolidated through repeated use, 
they themselves become stable aspects of cognition. 
Conceptual resources of varying grain-sizes 
Research reports that in some topics learners of certain ages appear to sometimes hold 
stable extended theory-like conceptual frameworks, but at other times researchers find 
respondents constructing responses in situ. Indeed, research that explores a learner’s 
thinking in a topic area over extended periods, can readily identify both labile and 
stable conceptions (Taber, 1995a).  
The work reviewed here suggests that it should be possible for researchers eliciting 
learners’ ideas in science to distinguish between stable ideas and those constructed in 
situ. This suggests that appropriate research questions are not whether or not learners’ 
ideas are stable (or coherent and so forth), as they sometimes, but not always, are; but 
rather which ideas tend to be stable; and what are the circumstances under which they 
stable (Taber, 2006a). The nature of the scientific concepts themselves, and the 
contexts in which they are evoked, are likely to be significant factors that interact with 
features of the individual’s cognitive structure. 
Nor is there a dichotomy here between two clusters of characteristics – it seems clear 
that in some topic areas students can hold several stable ways of explaining the same 
phenomena, with a particular idea being elicited according to various contextual cues 
(Taber, 2000 cf. Pope & Denicolo, 1986).  
Smith, diSessa and Roschelle (1993: 117) claimed that human “knowledge systems 
[are] composed of many interrelated elements that can change in complex ways” and 
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argued that “presumptions about the diversity and grain size of knowledge involved in 
mathematical and scientific expertise have typically been too few and too large” 
p.145).  
Thus, the researcher exploring students’ thinking and understanding has to be open to 
finding a range of different types of features, some of these being transient current 
combinations of more elementary stable features. Niedderer (2001: 400) discusses the 
“different types of stable cognitive elements in a model of the cognitive system”. 
Hammer and Elby (2003, p.58) use “the term ‘facets’ as a general reference to 
students’ conceptual resources”, where diSessa (1993: 111) refers to ‘elements’, i.e. 
“knowledge structures of different size and character (e.g. ideas, categories, concepts, 
models and theories)”. 
Two frames for interpreting research data 
Hammer (1996) has explored how both ideas about p-prims and ‘misconceptions’ can 
be applied to teaching and learning in physics. He and his colleagues point out, that 
many isolated examples of students’ thinking could well be interpreted in terms of 
either knowledge-in-pieces being constructed from something like p-prims, or the 
application of existing conceptions (which have previously been so constructed),  
In some cases, attributing robust conceptions is appropriate, but 
resources-based accounts afford the alternative of understanding the 
conception as a local or momentary activation of another sort of 
cognitive structure. 
Hammer, Elby, Scherr & Redish, 2005: 6. 
It may be difficult to distinguish between these two types of mechanism when 
exploring an individual response to a single question on one occasion (see below: 
‘testing for ‘knowledge-in-pieces’). Research that provides examples of in-depth and 
extended questioning, or attempts to explore ideas in a range of contexts, does 
however offer indications. So where responses are consistent over time and context, 
and where the respondent shows strong commitment to answers, it seems more likely 
that they derive from a pre-existing stable conception or conceptual framework.  
A knowledge-in-pieces account, then, may be particularly useful in explaining 
research that elicits inconsistent responses from the students. Such inconsistency is 
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not in itself firm evidence that knowledge is being constructed in situ: responses 
judged inconsistent from the scientific perspective may well seem consistent if 
appreciated from the students’ alternative perspective. Even when the student 
acknowledges that they are being inconsistent in their use of ideas, it is possible that 
they are inconsistently selecting from a toolkit of stable, pre-existing, notions 
(Mortimer, 1995; Taber, 1995b; 2000) and indeed the availability of alternative well-
developed conceptual structures may be an important requirement for some types of 
conceptual change (Thagard, 1992; Taber 2001; cf. Petri & Niedderer, 1998; Harrison 
& Treagust, 2000). 
However, where learners are asked questions about a topic where they lack any 
established and stable ways of thinking, they will need to construct their responses in 
situ, from more elementary conceptual facets (e.g. p-prims) and so are more likely to 
produce inconsistent answers as they can be strongly influenced by contextual 
features of particular questions or examples. 
An existing way of thinking about a topic allows subconscious processing of 
information that filters out (what are from that viewpoint) irrelevant features and 
selectively attends to the pertinent ones. In the absence of such a way of thinking, 
those features of new information seen as most salient are likely to vary across 
particular questions and examples, leading to less consistent responses. 
The inclusive view 
The reading of the literature taken here, then, is that when people are asked to think 
about natural phenomena, they sometimes draw upon well-established conceptual 
frameworks, and at other times they are only able to generate an appropriate response 
by constructing a framework for answering in situ, drawing upon available discrete 
conceptual assets. Clearly in both cases thinking has to rely upon the available mental 
resources, and the ‘apparatus’ of an individual’s cognitive structure has features that 
support both phenomena. Sometimes thinking involves accessing a complex stable 
conceptual element represented (‘stored’) in cognitive structure, re-cognised as 
suitable to ‘do the job’, whereas when such a ready thinking tool is not available we 
have to be creative. This is clearly linked with familiarity with the field concerned: an 
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expert will have previously constructed conceptual frameworks ‘stored’ in memory 
that are not available to the novice (Mestre, 1994; Abdullah, 2006). 
The present paper sets out to build upon this view by considering a model of 
cognition that is inclusive in that it encompasses both the ‘alternative conceptions’ 
and the ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ perspectives. Clearly the present state of brain science 
is such that aspects of cognitive functioning are not understood in detail. Therefore 
models of cognition tend to be based around a ‘black box’ approach, where mental 
faculties are identified from patterns in empirical data, and cognitive modules posited 
without necessarily being associated with an identifiable brain structure (e.g. Dawson, 
1998). So notions such as ‘working memory’ (Baddeley, 1986) and the ‘language 
acquisition device’ (Chomsky, 1999) may be proposed, and characterised in terms of 
their functions without being mapped onto identifiable anatomical features. 
The model discussed here is derived from well-accepted principles and ideas (e.g. 
Baddeley, 1990; Eysenck & Keane, 1990; Kellogg, 1995), and has the following 
major components: 
• perception; 
• conscious and unconscious thinking; 
• ‘genetic’ predispositions built into the cognitive apparatus; 
• conceptual structures stored in memory (i.e. represented in cognitive 
structure); 
• development and learning. 
Perception: the brain receives information inputs from the senses. Although sensory 
information relates to colour, pitch, hotness, intensity of pressure, etc, most has 
already been filtered and interpreted by the time we are consciously aware of it – e.g. 
we perceive a person smiling, a researcher asking a question, a bird flying overhead, 
or some other identified phenomenon. There is clearly a great deal of information 
processing in the form of pattern-recognition that precedes the conscious perception 
of objects, people, or situations. 
Conscious and unconscious thinking: Thinking involves processing information – e.g. 
to answer a question or solve a problem. We are aware of our conscious thinking, but 
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there is clearly a great deal of mental processing that is part of our thinking that is 
usually subconscious (Boden, 1992). In conscious thinking we can be aware of the 
concepts we may draw upon, and so may make an argument explicit. Subconscious 
thinking presents its outcomes to consciousness as insight - the ‘aha’ moment 
(Koestler, 1982) - but does not give us access to how the outcomes were arrived at. 
Subconscious thinking is ‘automatic’, drawing upon mechanisms we may label as 
intuitive (Brock, 2006). Conscious thinking is required where no automatic routine is 
available, and is necessary where we wish to understand or are expected to justify our 
decisions. 
Genetic predispositions built into the cognitive apparatus: human brains have evolved 
to process information in ways that have allowed their ‘owners’ to survive long 
enough to leave offspring. Certain ways of thinking have proved adaptive and have 
been selected. These may include aspects of pattern recognition, such as readily 
‘seeing’ faces when minimal cues are available (Mehler & Dupoux, 1994), and 
perhaps explains thinking about ‘natural kinds’ (such as readily accepting, and 
establishing membership of, classes such as ‘tree’) that seem to be widespread among 
human cultures (Kuhn, 1989; Keil, 1992). The development of language is believed to 
be supported by an evolved predisposition to learn a certain kind of grammar 
(Chomsky, 1999). 
Conceptual structures represented in memory: we can represent in memory, i.e. in 
cognitive structure, (a) specific entities in our environment (my wife, your computer) 
to allow us to recognise them readily, and (b) general concepts (wife, computer, acid, 
plant, force) that allow us to classify novel instances and so activate ‘appropriate’ 
responses, and (c) abstract relationships between concepts (element to compound; 
Newton’s third law; humans as primates as mammals as chordates as animals as 
living things) that may be used to understand and explain aspects of the natural (and 
social) world. 
Development and learning: over time we change our behaviour in response to some 
stimuli. The way we process information changes. For example, we may make certain 
thinking tasks routine (and so subconscious) that previously required active 
concentration (Kellog, 1995). Some of this may be considered due to ‘developmental 
processes’. Hearing the sounds of a particular language fine-tunes perception to more 
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readily discriminate the sounds of that language (Saffran & Thiessen, 2003) and, by 
corollary, makes it more difficult to perceive the different discriminations used in 
other languages. The learning of the particular grammar of a specific language 
requires hearing sufficient examples of the use of the language, but is 
underdetermined by the available data (implying a genetic component) and can be 
successfully achieved through any of myriad sub-samples of the possible linguistic 
permutations that become available to the learner (Pinker, 1995).  
Other changes may be dependent upon specific sensory input: being taught about 
calculus, watching a film about astronauts on the moon, listening to recordings by the 
Beatles, reading about Charles Darwin’s campaign for a public service pension for 
Alfred Russel Wallace – are all potentially learning experiences that can facilitate 
specific changes in cognitive structure. 
Aspects of cognitive structure representing our knowledge systems are available to 
subconscious as well as conscious processing: we perceive our house or our friend, 
not a building or person that we then have to identify by consciously accessing 
memory. 
(figure 2 about here) 
 
Figure 2: A representation of cognition reflecting the model 
discussed in this paper 
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Considering just these components of cognition leads to a complex model (which is at 
least partially represented in figure 2). In particular, it leads us to consider two key 
issues: 
Process and structure: cognition is a set of processes, such as ‘perception’, ‘thinking’ 
and ‘remembering’. However, these processes are facilitated by the cognitive 
apparatus, that is part of the physical structure of the brain itself. Conceptual 
structures are represented in cognitive structure when learning is encoded in memory 
- itself part of brain structure. Often in science education, research results are 
presented in terms of conjectured features of cognitive structure (cf. Phillips, 1987), 
although these are not directly observable (see figure 1). Reports of aspects of 
learners’ cognitive structures (World 1) are based on inferences from the learners’ 
reports (or other observed behaviour expressed in World 3), which are indirect 
evidence of cognition (experienced by the learner in World 2). That is, reports of 
cognitive ‘structure’ (representing learned conceptual knowledge) are always 
mediated by ‘process’ (thinking). 
Tacit and explicit thinking: if much of our cognition, the actual processing, is at the 
level of perception and intuitive or other subconscious processing, then even the 
learners themselves only have direct access to the outcomes of these processes, not the 
processes themselves.  
These considerations are further complicated by the dynamic nature of the physical 
‘substrate’ through which processing occurs. Part of the complexity (and utility value) 
of the human brain derives from the cognitive ‘system’ being organic. It has a 
structure that channels cognition, but which also evolves in response to those very 
processes of cognition (so that human behaviour can be culturally mediated and is not 
purely instinctive). So when abstract concepts (perhaps such as natural kinds like 
‘tree’ that the human brain has a propensity to develop; perhaps formal concepts such 
as ‘plant’ taught in a science class) are formed, they become represented in cognitive 
structure and later available as both the objects of thought, and tools to think with. 
Thinking with concepts allows the possibility of forming associations, which may 
leave permanent traces in cognitive structure in terms of changing the way thinking 
about one concept promotes or suppresses the activation of another. 
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Considering relationships between concepts, may lead to new conceptions  (perhaps 
inferred through intuitive pattern recognition mechanisms, the p-prims; perhaps folk-
beliefs communicated from the life-world; perhaps formal science knowledge learnt 
in class). A conception may itself then become represented in cognitive structure (and 
so may then be considered as a ‘stored’ conceptual structure subsequently available to 
the learner). This then becomes a ‘pre-packaged’ tool for thinking, and so a potential 
element for constructing more elaborate conceptual structures, that may then in turn 
also be represented in cognitive structure. This is the positive feedback cycle referred 
to in figure 2. Over time, quite extensive complexes of concepts and their 
relationships may become established, ‘stored’ and readily activated – something that 
may be characterised (in World 3, e.g. in research reports) as a conceptual framework 
becomes represented as a stable aspect of the learner’s cognitive structure. 
According to constructivist notions of learning, new learning builds upon existing 
knowledge, and in time can act as the foundations of further learning: giving the 
potential for building and storing ever more complex knowledge structures. In this 
model, the more basic units, such as concepts and conceptions, are both available as 
discrete objects and tools of thought, and also represented as components of more 
complex structures that can be accessed holistically. 
Thinking of elementary knowledge structures as ‘bricks’ for constructing knowledge 
may be misleading, as this is a non-conservative process: that is, there is a form of re-
representation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1996: 21) of an original that is itself retained, 
the original … representations remain intact in the child’s mind and 
can continue to be called for particular cognitive goals which 
require speed and automaticity. The redescribed representations are 
used for other goals where explicit knowledge is required. 
Karmiloff-Smith’s theory of representational redescription assumes a change in the 
‘coding’ format (such as producing a verbal description of an image), but human 
cognition also seems to involve the ability to use ‘the same’ basic conceptual units as 
components of different ‘stored’ complexes, and it may be that authentic modelling of 
cognitive structure requires ‘copying’ of conceptual elements for use in different parts 
of the conceptual structure (cf. Thagard, 1992), rather than the form of a web of 
highly interconnected concepts where each concept occupies a single node. 
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The overall conceptual structure represented in a person’s cognitive structure can be 
considered as a single extensive network: but perhaps one including considerable 
redundancy of conceptual elements, as well as some degree of clustering into domains 
(Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994) such that thinking ‘within’ a domain is easier than 
‘between’ domains (cf. Solomon, 1993). Whether such a network model can be 
consistent with the branching ontological trees envisioned by Chi (1992) is not clear – 
but it is clear that there is much more work to be done in this area. 
Whatever the details, such a model of cognition allows thinking that is generative and 
creative (‘knowledge-in-pieces’ that may produce ideas that may often be quite 
labile), as well as thinking that is largely running accessed ‘stored’ conceptual 
schemes of various complexity (and so is likely to show stable patterns of thought, 
e.g. those deserving reification as ‘alternative conceptions’). Basic processing at the 
level of p-prims may play a role both in the interpretation of new ‘input’, and also by 
virtue of having channeled the formation of the ‘stored’ (represented) concepts and 
conceptions that are later used as the basis for building up more complex knowledge 
structures.  
This is a synthetic or inclusive model that, following the approach of diSessa and 
Hammer and their colleagues (Smith et al, 1993; Hammer et al, 2005), admits the 
interpretation of research data both in terms of (i) the extent to which findings 
represent permanent structure or just in vivo processing; and (ii) in the range of ‘grain-
sizes’ of conceptual structures that may be accessed in studying student thinking. 
Such a model has great potential for explaining research findings (as will be discussed 
in the next section). However, it also clearly has the potential to support multiple 
interpretations of data and so, potentially, make researchers’ conclusions immune 
from refutation (something that will be addressed in the final part of this paper). 
Some findings from studies into learning chemistry 
Much of the work on p-prims and the ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ derives from studies of 
learning and thinking in physics contexts. Certainly physics offers a domain where 
‘intuitive theories’ may be expected (Espinoza, 2005). It is very common for learners 
to develop an understanding of force and motion such that motion is assumed to imply 
an acting force (Watts & Zylbersztajn, 1981), and it is easy to see this as an 
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abstraction of common patterns (in common experience: pushing, lifting, kicking, 
jumping and throwing all involve motion that soon stops). When researchers ask 
about such phenomena, learners often offer explanations that suggest they are using 
notions such as speed depending upon applied force (Viennot, 1979) or forces 
providing some kind of ‘impetus’ that is exhausted by the motion (Gilbert & 
Zylbersztajn, 1985). At the point where these explanations are elicited the learners 
seem to ‘have’ such conceptions of motion. 
However, it is less clear if learners have formed explicit conceptions of this type prior 
to being asked to offer verbal accounts of such situations. It may well be that their 
beliefs were previously ‘intuitive physics’, being at the level of the ability to mentally 
simulate such situations on the basis of prior experience (Georgiou, 2005), and so 
visualise mooted scenarios (Gilbert, 2005), rather than formalised knowledge 
available as verbal propositions relating concepts of force, speed, velocity and 
acceleration. 
So, as Hammer (1996) pointed out, reports of thinking elicited in Physics contexts 
such as these could potentially be explained either (a) in terms of the application of 
previously ‘stored’ alternative conceptions and frameworks, or (b) the generation of 
an account based on mental simulations using implicit knowledge at the level of p-
prims. It seems informative to consider the value of the p-prims notion and the 
‘knowledge-in-pieces’ perspective beyond physics learning. Research into student 
thinking in chemistry can offer a usefully different context.  
In chemistry there have been many reports of alternative conceptions or alternative 
frameworks that would seem to offer a more demanding test of the usefulness of the 
p-prims notion and the ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ approach. Many studies of student 
thinking in chemistry do not concern learners’ ideas about directly observable 
phenomena (such as moving balls) but rather concern the submicroscopic world of 
particles such as electrons, ions and molecules (Harrison & Treagust, 2002). It is 
fairly clear that students’ ideas about the nature and properties of atomic level 
particles are not abstractions from their own direct experiences of the phenomena. 
Knowledge of the atomic world is knowledge of models developed by humans, and 
communicated within our culture through talk, books and so forth. Where students 
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develop incorrect ideas in this realm it seems that either they have been ‘mis-taught’, 
or they have misinterpreted the teaching they have received (or some combination of 
both). 
An alternative conceptual framework from chemistry 
For example, it has been reported that learners commonly develop thinking that has 
been represented as an alternative conceptual framework for thinking about chemical 
bonding and reactions – the octet framework. This has been described as an extensive 
set of related c nceptions concerning the types of chemical bond that are formed, the 
nature and status of different forms of bonds, the rationale for reaction, and 
mechanisms of bond formation (Taber, 1998a). It has been shown that in at least some 
cases key aspects of the framework are very stable, with students offering consistent 
responses in a wide range of question contexts, and over extended periods of time 
(Taber, 1995a, 2000, 2003a).  
So here we have a complex and inter-related set of ideas, not based upon personal 
experience of the phenomena, and considered to be stable. The interpretation offered 
was that students developed complex permanent representations in memory that were 
accessed and applied when they were asked to discuss a wide range of atomic level 
scenarios. This is not to suggest that students were not generating responses in 
interviews. General ideas were applied to a range of specific examples, and it is not 
claimed that research interviews were merely eliciting recall. A question about the 
bonding in, say potassium iodide, could lead to the respondent identifying ‘ionic 
bonding’ as the key concept (based on some learned criteria), and then discussing the 
example in terms of the propositions that were part of a conceptual framework that 
was activated through thinking about that concept. 
However, given what is understood about the limitations of human cognitive 
processing and in particular the capacity of working memory (Miller, 1968), it does 
not seem feasible that the framework of general propositions was itself generated 
anew from totally discrete conceptions in memory in response to each new question. 
Rather it seems likely that many students do hold in memory (have represented in 
cognitive structure) an extensive framework of conceptions about chemical bonding 
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that becomes increasingly ‘robust’ and integrated during their learning of the subject 
(Taber, 2003a). 
This would seem to be an example where the ‘alternative conceptions/conceptual 
frameworks’ perspective can explain the research findings, but the ‘knowledge-in-
pieces’ approach has difficulties (unlike the case of the relationship of forces and 
motion which would seem to be explainable from either perspective). Evidence of 
stable, extended patterns of thinking in such an abstract area would seem to imply that 
the learner has constructed permanent representations of conceptual frameworks in 
long-term memory. 
A role for p-prims in learning chemistry 
However, although it is argued that the ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ approach does not offer 
a feasible explanation of research findings in this case, this does not imply there is no 
role for cognitive processing at the level of p-prims. The core feature of the octet 
framework is an explanatory principle that atoms strive to fill their shells. Although it 
is a useful chemical heuristic that species (atoms, ions, molecules) with certain 
electronic structures tend to be more stable, students commonly adopt this principle 
and elevate it to (inappropriately) ‘explain’ chemical processes. The extent to which 
this common adoption of an invalid principle is a common misinterpretation of 
teaching, or is recycled through inaccurate teaching, remains an open question. 
However, it is clearly the case that the notion of a ‘full shell’ having special properties 
is intuitively attractive to, and so readily adopted by, learners. 
No school student can have direct experience of electronic structures of atomic-level 
species, or any way of empirically judging the stability of different electronic 
arrangements. So, it is conjectured that in learning about the molecular world as 
mediated by the models presented in class, some intuitive pattern recognition process 
acts to assign special significance to ‘full shells’. 
Here we have a candidate for a p-prim that may well be operating in the learning of 
chemistry. This leads to the hypothesis that in processing the information that most 
stable structures have particular electronic arrangements (full shells in relation to the 
first two periods of elements) some p-prim identifies something about the ‘fullness’, 
or perhaps the symmetry, of the pattern and marks it out as especially significant. 
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Such a pattern becomes considered as ‘desirable’, and a sufficient driver and rationale 
for chemical processes (reactions; bond formation; ion formation). There is a 
predisposition to interpreting information according to certain patterns, leading to new 
conceptions, which can then be applied and acted upon as conceptual resources 
themselves. 
At the present time this suggestion is presented as no more than a hypothesis. If we 
seek to understand learning in science then phenomena such as the widespread 
occurrence of a tenacious, but scientifically invalid, ‘full shells explanatory principle’ 
need to be explained. Some form of intuitive pattern-recognition process that 
foregrounds the ‘full shells’ gestalt in student thinking seems a strong candidate 
mechanism in this case. 
Other candidates for p-prims operating in learning chemistry 
This is not the only example of common alternative ways of student thinking in 
chemistry where p-prims may help explain research findings. Another example 
concerns the way students conceptualise the electrical interactions within in an atom 
or ion (Taber, 1998b).  
Students commonly seem to expect either that forces act on the electrons from the 
nucleus, but not vice versa, or at least that the force on the electrons from the nucleus 
will be larger than the force on the nucleus. This pattern seems to be very similar to 
one that may be proposed in much larger systems – for example considering the sun 
to exert a force on the orbiting planets, but not being subject to a (Newton third-law 
pair) force itself. One way of interpreting these ways of thinking is to suggest that 
whereas the scientist makes a clear distinction between the size of a force (the same 
on both bodies) and the effect of the force (larger on the less massive body), the 
learner does not make such a distinction, and conflates the force with its effect. It 
seems there is a candidate p-prim here: common experience leads to recognising the 
pattern that the bigger/‘stronger’ body has the greatest effect, and when the student 
considers a diagram of an atom or ion it may well be perceived in terms of such a 
pattern, with the nucleus as the larger and more influential body. 
However, it may be that the centrality of the nucleus is also significant here. Work 
being undertaken at Kalmar University in Sweden by Karina Adbo (personal 
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correspondence) suggests that many students may well see the nucleus of an atom as 
fixed in space. From the scientific point of view we might simply consider this as an 
explicit and suitable choice of a frame of reference when modelling the atom: but 
when this ‘choice’ is made tacitly at some intuitive level by the learner, then the 
nucleus may well be considered as stationary in a more ‘absolute’ sense. 
To return to the electrical interactions, it is common for students to consider that 
somehow an atomic nucleus can produce a fixed amount of attraction, which is 
somehow shared out among the electrons (so that removing an electron allows a 
redistribution of its share). This was originally reported from a UK interview study 
(Taber, 1998b) and the finding was later replicated in surveys of UK learners (Taber, 
2003b). The same conception has since been found in a survey of learners in 
Singapore (Tan, Taber, Goh & Chia, 2005) and among learners in a number of other 
countries (Tan, Goh, Chia, Taber, Liu, Coll, Lorenzo & Li, accepted for publication). 
The notion of ‘sharing out’ does not match the scientific model, but would again seem 
a suitable candidate for the operation of a pattern recognition process at early levels of 
cognitive processing: a p-prim (Taber & Tan, 2007). 
Further candidate p-prims have been suggested by an interview study using the 
‘interviews-about-events’ approach (White & Gunstone, 1992) to elicit explanations 
of phenomena such as mixing, dissolving and reacting from secondary age students in 
the UK (García Franco & Taber, 2006). The findings of the study suggested a number 
of patterns in student explanations that would seem to be candidates for deriving from 
p-prims. For example, in chemical reactions between two reactants, it was common 
for students to see one of the reactants as the ‘active’ cause of the reaction, whilst the 
other was a passive partner being acted upon. A related idea was the common attempt 
to identify an external agent responsible for causing a change. This is certainly a 
reasonable principle, but in science processes such as diffusion and mixing, or 
evaporation, may be explained in terms of ‘internal’ causes - the energy and inherent 
movement of particles. Such inherent motion is unintuitive (cf. Piaget, 1973/1929), so 
the reasonable expectation of an active cause leads to students assigning causality to 
irrelevant features. 
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P-prims in other science disciplines 
It is suggested then that the knowledge-in-pieces perspective that has been the focus 
of much attention in physics education may also be useful in exploring learning 
trajectories and difficulties in chemistry. The synthetic model discussed in this paper 
could also be useful in the life and environmental sciences. For example, the common 
notion that the ‘stuff’ that plants are comprised of largely originates in the soil is 
considered a very common and tenacious alternative conception (Bell & Brook, 
1984), that could derive from some form of p-prim(s). Similarly, life-world ontologies 
of the living world (Kuhn, 1989) – that trees are a natural kind, that fungi are plants, 
that spiders should be grouped with insects, that mammals are a major taxonomic 
group (often identified as ‘animals’) – would seem strong candidates from deriving 
from ‘primitive’ pattern-recognition features of cognition. Such aspects of students’ 
scientific thinking about the living world may well be illuminated by research 
informed by the type of inclusive view of conceptual resources discussed here.  
Indeed, although there may well be reason to consider knowledge of the living world 
and the material world as forming somewhat distinct domains (Mithen, 1998), 
knowledge construction about all aspects of the natural world would be channeled by 
the same p-prims. For example, it was suggested above that the salience of aspects of 
symmetry could be significant in the development of some alternative conceptions in 
chemistry. A very different context from biology would be learning about 
photosynthesis and respiration. Here some students seem to readily develop the 
alternative conception that respiration only occurs at night (Alparslan, Tekkaya & 
Geban, 2003), despite this being inconsistent with the target curriculum knowledge 
that emphasises the energy requirements of ongoing cellular metabolism. The 
intuitive attractiveness of this notion, despite it being inconsistent with other learning, 
could well be linked to some similar basic perceptual bias for identifying symmetry: 
i.e. that if photosynthesis (represented as 6CO2 + 6H20 → C6H12O6 + 6O2) can only 
occur during the day, then the ‘opposite’ process (C6H12O6 + 6O2→ 6CO2 + 6H20) 
should only occur at night. This is, at present, purely a conjecture, but illustrates the 
potential for p-prims to play a role in the formation of biological conceptions. 
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‘Just so’ stories and progressive research into science learning 
The starting point for this paper was a discussion about the status of findings reporting 
student ideas in science, and in particular whether researchers are uncovering thinking 
(a) that reflects well-established, stable features of cognitive structure (i.e. conceptual 
knowledge coded in long-term memory), deserving such labels as ‘conceptual 
frameworks’; or (b) generated in situ from ‘knowledge-in-pieces’: separate discrete 
and more elementary knowledge elements, such as p-prims. 
Research that derives largely from studies of physics learning and which suggests that 
a ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ approach explains many research findings was reviewed, 
although it was pointed out that the key theorists do not suggest that all student 
thinking is the outcome of knowledge structures generated in situ, but rather that 
much elicited thinking is of this form. 
This approach was developed in terms of a descriptive model of cognition that 
assumed both elementary and largely intuitive aspects of cognitive apparatus, as well 
as the formation of concepts and conceptions that could be ‘stored’ (i.e. represented in 
cognitive structure) and accessed explicitly, and which could be used to construct 
more extensive knowledge structures that might through reinforcement themselves 
become ‘stored’ in memory: allowing complex and integrated conceptual learning. 
This perspective was then applied to consider some examples of findings from studies 
into student thinking in chemical topics. It was argued that although the ‘knowledge-
in-pieces’ perspective cannot fully explain the reported research findings, there 
nevertheless are some feasible candidates for p-prims that may be operating to filter 
and channel student thinking as they construct conceptions of the unfamiliar 
molecular world – conceptions that will provide components for the building of the 
more extensive knowledge structures. It was also suggested, in terms of some albeit 
tentative examples, that a similar perspective could be valuable in exploring learning 
in the life sciences. 
The inclusive approach taken here would seem to be consistent with both a good deal 
of thinking about cognition and memory (Baddeley, 1990; Eysenck & Keane, 1990; 
Kellogg, 1995), and a basic constructivist perspective on learning (Taber, 2006a). The 
model assumes that thinking draws upon both cognitive biases in the human brain, 
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and conceptual structures that have become established through previous cognition 
and represented permanently in cognitive structure. Thinking accesses the existing 
conceptual resources (i.e. activates the representation in cognitive structure), and in 
doing so generates more complex knowledge structures, at least some of which will 
leave permanent traces in memory - so building up the sophistication of the available 
conceptual resources for subsequent thinking. 
A key point then is the iterative nature of this process. This means that over time 
knowledge may be ‘chunked’ to overcome the inherent limitations of working 
memory (Kellogg, 1995). It also means that initial perceptual or other biases in 
processing may become fossilised in knowledge structures (cf. Bachelard, 1968). This 
can lead to students developing complex and well-integrated knowledge structures 
that have been shaped by pre-conscious ‘intuitive’ pattern-recognition processes 
which may put them at odds with scientific thinking. If this is at the level of ‘re-
cognising’, for example, the teacher’s description of heat as being a kind of material 
fluid, or intuitively perceiving full electron shells as having inherent stability, or 
classifying insects as something other than animals, then it may be that such processes 
can direct knowledge construction away from the direction intended in teaching. 
Using the model to develop bold conjectures 
So this model of cognition can be used to make sense of a lot of research data, and to 
explain why we should expect learners’ ideas to show considerable variations in terms 
of stability, level of commitment, and degrees of sophistication. This, however, may 
be a weakness as well as a strength. A model that offers interpretations of such a 
range of data brings the danger that we can use it to provide ‘just so’ stories that can 
interpret any findings from our research. However, ‘just so’ stories do not form a 
good basis for informing pedagogy. Teachers do not need a model that can explain 
away whatever ideas their students offer, but advice on how to teach to support 
students in developing ways of thinking that better match curriculum models.  
In Lakatos’ (1970) notion of scientific research programmes, the different theoretical 
models that are developed are called ‘refutable variants’. As Popper (1989) has 
emphasised, to be refutable a theory has to offer predictions that are testable and 
capable of being (in principle) falsified. Indeed, for Popper (1979: 53), the best 
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science involves the production of ‘bold conjectures’. For Lakatos, a research 
programme may degenerate if theory is only modified to fit to existing data. To 
remain ‘scientific’ a research programme must be progressive. Lakatos argues that a 
research programme, 
is theoretically progressive if each modification leads to new 
unexpected predictions and it is empirically progressive if at least 
some of these novel predictions are corroborated. It is always easy 
for a scientist to deal with a given anomaly by making suitable 
adjustments to his programme … Such maneuvers are ad hoc, and 
the programme is degenerating, unless they not only explain the 
given facts they were intended to explain, but also predict some new 
facts as well. 
Lakatos, 1978: 179. 
The model of cognition discussed in this paper can explain the wide range of findings 
from published research into learners’ ideas in science, even though the underlying 
assumptions of different studies are often in themselves offering inconsistent views of 
the nature of the phenomenon studied. The synthetic model discussed can ‘save the 
phenomenon’ by offering a range of categories that can accommodate most research 
findings in the field. Whatever the researcher claims about the nature of the ideas 
elicited (romanced, tenacious, stable, labile, committed, and so forth), the model 
allows the findings to fit.  
An analogy might be a research programme that looked to characterise books in a 
library. Different research groups, using different approaches to sampling libraries 
might come to very different conclusions: regarding, for example, what books are 
about, whether they are factual or fantasy (or something in between), how big they 
are, whether they include diagrams, the kind of binding, the reading demands made by 
the text, the size of print, and even the language in which they are written. Clearly an 
inclusive model might make sense of these different findings by suggesting that there 
are all kinds of books available in the library, and just going to one shelf is likely to 
give a distorted and limited view. This would explain the different interpretations that 
have been offered, but does not help anyone who wants to locate particular books in 
the library. 
What is needed is some sort of model of where to locate different kinds of books. 
However, if our analogy is to offer a good comparison with research into learners’ 
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ideas, we should acknowledge that the existing studies have not only used a range of 
methodological approaches, but have sampled the books from different libraries. It 
may be that all these libraries, with their different holdings and physical spaces, use 
similar basic principles for acquiring and organising their stock, but that may not be 
immediately obvious from the data which is available! 
This analogy leads us to ask if the synthetic model discussed here can be more than a 
ad hoc attempt to patch theory to data. To contribute to a progressive research 
programme the model must offer predictions that are testable. This means that the 
predictions must be falsifiable – more than just predicting that research will continue 
to find that learners’ ideas seem to have a range of characteristics. It is suggested that 
the synthetic model can offer predictions that could be tested. 
Testing for ‘knowledge-in-pieces’ 
The model allows elicited ideas about science to be an application of a stable complex 
conceptual framework, or be constructed in situ from more elementary conceptual 
resources. Distinguishing these situations may be important in informing teaching. 
Tenacious alternative conceptions and frameworks may need to be made explicit and 
directly challenged if students are to be persuaded to shift from using them (Driver & 
Oldham, 1986). However if alternative ideas found in research are just in situ 
generations, formed by combining more ‘elementary’ conceptual resources, then 
Different presentations, problems, task framings and so on are likely 
to elicit different aspects of students’ knowledge and reasoning. 
Hammer, 2004b: 8 
Then it becomes useful to know under what conditions particular ‘alternative’ ideas 
are most likely to be generated, so that teachers can avoid some contexts and lines of 
questioning until students have been channeled towards ways of thinking that are 
more in line with curriculum science. Neither of these approaches is straightforward, 
but knowing when each is indicated is a starting point for research to develop 
pedagogy, and advice to teachers. 
It will not be simple to distinguish these alternatives. We might expect ‘more’ 
consistency in responses when students are drawing upon well-established conceptual 
structures. However, the presence of manifold alternative conceptions may provide a 
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range of response options somehow cued by context, and apparently similar questions 
may not be perceived as such by the learner. Similarly, if a student can generate a 
new mental model of a phenomenon from disparate conceptual resources on one 
occasion, then clearly there is the potential to reconstruct the same model in response 
to similar questions (perhaps cued as a response option by having been recently used), 
or on another occasion (possibly with the previous activation leading to permanent 
synaptic changes increasing the likelihood of reactivation later). 
However, it may be possible to distinguish conceptual complexes that are accessed 
‘whole’ from those generated anew by considering the cognitive load required to 
apply the ideas (Tsaparlis, 1994). If, as widely believed, an individual’s working 
memory has a limited and fairly fixed ‘capacity’, then this may provide a means for 
exploring whether a student’s ideas are being accessed as a single ‘chunk’ of 
information from memory, or are generated by the in situ coordination of several 
discrete conceptual resources. 
The ability to solve problems or complete tasks depends both on task complexity and 
the number of recalled chunks of information that need to be coordinated. The same 
individual should be more limited in applying ideas that are generated by coordinating 
discrete conceptual resources than in applying a conceptual ‘complex’ already 
‘stored’ in long-term memory. Here we have the basis for devising tests for the 
presence of thinking in terms of conceptual frameworks or knowledge-in-pieces.  
Identifying p-prims 
By their nature p-prims operate at a preconscious level, so that they can only be 
inferred indirectly by the conceptions that may derive from them. So, for example, we 
can explore with students whether they really believe that atoms seek full shells, or 
that nuclear force is shared between electrons, but we can only speculate about the 
mechanisms that lead particular students to think in these ways. However, once 
candidate p-prims are nominated, it may then be possible to test out whether other 
learners do commonly seem to have predispositions to see such patterns in sensory 
data. 
For example, if learners who have not studied atomic structure are presented with 
information about the electronic structures of atoms and ions it might be possible to 
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explore any intuitive responses to the patterns of the structures (and common 
representations of them) before they have been exposed to any teaching about the 
stability and significance of noble gas structures. If at this stage learners commonly 
offer intuitive beliefs that aspects of symmetry or ‘completeness’ would be more 
stable, or ‘desirable’, then there would seem to be a strong perceptual bias that could 
operate in interpreting teaching. If such beliefs were not elicited at this early stage, 
then this would suggest the later development of such beliefs could owe more to 
features of current pedagogy than to a ‘p-prim’. 
Clearly in the latter case a change in emphasis in teaching might avoid the 
development of unhelpful ways of thinking. In the former case remediation is likely to 
be more problematic as alternative ideas develop from very primitive levels of 
processing, so that bias is introduced before any conscious processing is possible. 
However it may be possible over time to catalogue the p-prims that are common to 
most learners, and identify which p-prims could bias thinking towards scientific ideas 
in particular topics. It may then be possible to develop instruction that uses forms of 
representation that are more likely to trigger particular p-prims.  
Conclusion 
Clearly the suggestions made here are somewhat speculative, and significant further 
research on the specific foci is indicated. This is seen as appropriate in a progressive 
research programme. A synthetic model is explored, that is considered one ‘refutable 
variant’ of the body of theory being developed in the research community to 
understand learning in science. This model accommodates existing findings, and 
suggests directions for generating predictions that can be tested by further empirical 
work. 
Neither accounts of learners’ alternative scientific ideas reflecting stable conceptual 
frameworks nor accounts of them being generated in situ fit all the available research 
findings. The synthetic model can accommodate the presence of both possibilities, 
showing that both would be expected depending (for instance) upon the level of 
familiarity with the perceived context of a research probe. However the model can 
also lead to new predictions (e.g. about how ideas with different origins may make 
different demands on working memory; about how p-prims should be detectable by 
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the way they influence initial interpretations when learners are first introduced to new 
material in the absence of potentially ‘leading’ teaching), and in this way the model 
has heuristic power in suggesting possible directions for further research. 
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